The doctrine of informed consent in medical law and ethics has a strong grounding in the principle of bodily autonomy and self-determination of human beings.
Introduction
That the body of every person is inviolate has been recognized as a fundamental principle (Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization), 1990) . Directly flowing from this is the duty to respect the physical integrity of that person which can be legally violated only with the valid consent of that person. Medical treatment, diagnosis, examination etc. requires that the doctor touch or physically contact the patient. However, a legal requirement exists which mandates that a patient with capacity must give consent before being subject to any medical procedure. This is a reflection and reaffirmation of the principle of patient autonomy or right of selfdetermination of a person (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, 1993; see Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 1914, p. 126 : "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body"). For consent to treatment to be legally valid, three elements must be present (Grubb, Liang, & McHale, 2010, ¶ 8.68): 2. consent must be based upon information about risks; and 3. consent must be voluntary.
It is with the second element of a valid consent that the doctrine of 'informed consent' relates to. The doctrine was first formulated in the United States in 1971 in the case of Canterbury v Spence.
1 In this case, the doctrine was formulated to impose a duty on physicians to disclose all material risks. Slowly, this doctrine in its various manifestations came to be recognized in
the United Kingdom (Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the
Maudsley Hospital and others, 1985; and later comprehensively adopted in Chester v Afshar, 2004) and to a certain extent in India.
Definition of Informed Consent
Consent is considered fully informed when a capacitated (or "competent") patient or research subject to whom full disclosures have been made and who understands fully all that has been disclosed, voluntarily consents to treatment or participation on this basis (Eyal, 2012) . This definition though is not very helpful in understanding the constituents of the doctrine. The interpretation of informed consent has turned on various factors such as rick disclosure, nature of risk, and extent of disclosure and so on. Though it is agreed that certain minimum standards of informed consent must exist, it is generally the case that medical ethics places a higher standard of compliance than medical law (Miola, 2007) . The doctrine of informed consent therefore demands recognition of a patient's right to be informed of the risks inherent in medical treatment, side effects and alternatives to the proposed treatment (Cane & Conaghan, 2008, p. 202 ).
Informed consent is important both in medical procedures as well as medical research. This paper will focus only on the former, however, where necessary, references to the latter will be made. This paper will examine the development of the doctrine of informed consent in both the UK and India. In Part I, the development of the case law from Sidaway to Chester and beyond will analysed. This part will conclude with the current legal and ethical position relating to informed consent in the UK. In Part II, the law in India relating to consent and specifically informed consent will be analysed. Also, an effort will be made to place the applicability and development of the doctrine in a statutory law setting. Part III Conclusion will contain an analysis into whether informed consent and mechanisms put in place to effectuate it actually enhance patient choice and autonomy and to that end if they validate the existence of such a doctrine. Especially the need for a doctrine of informed consent in India will be discussed, with its myriad insufficiencies in the health and medical care sector and with the lessons that must be learnt from experiences with the doctrine in other countries.
Finally, the author will comment as to how the courts can play a positive role in bringing about social change by adopting the doctrine of informed consent.
Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent

Philosophical grounding of the doctrine
The main debates surrounding informed consent deal with principles such as protection, autonomy, prevention of abusive conduct, trust, self-ownership, non-domination, and personal integrity (Eyal, 2012) .
However, Peter H Schuck identifies informed consent to be of three variations: informed consent 'in books', 'in mind' and 'in action' (Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 1994, p. 903 clear that there exist considerable gaps between the three and especially in the academic opinion about informed consent and its true applicability and scope. Schuck proposes that informed consent must be reconsidered to make it more cost-effective, to ensure that risks are communicated with a comparative cost-benefit analysis and finally that any perception of risks is dependent on the context a particular individual or society places it in (Schuck, p. 906; for a similar argument, see Manson & O'Neill, 2007, pp. 68-96) .
The point of consent procedures is to limit deception and coercion, they should be designed to give patients and others control over the amount of information they receive and opportunity to rescind consent already given (O'Neill, 2003, pp. 4-7 ; for a moral point-ofview of informed consent, see Pattinson, 2006, p. 116) .
United Kingdom: From Bolam and Sidaway to Chester and beyond
The development of a duty to disclose risks to patients becoming a part of the doctrine of informed consent began with the Bolam case (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, 1957) . This case declined any application of the informed consent doctrine in the UK and instead reaffirmed the paternalistic attitude that courts had towards the medical profession. The approach was more on the lines of whether the standard of risk disclosure required of doctors was an 'accepted medical practice': that a doctor would not be negligent if he failed to disclose a risk and which failure was endorsed by a responsible body of medical opinion (Stauch, Wheat, & Tingle, 2006, p. 139 ).
The first case after Bolam, where a classic informed consent/risk disclosure scenario was
examined was the Sidaway case (Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal
Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others, 1985) . The decision in this case turned on how a risk could be defined to be material so as to make it necessary to be disclosed.
In
Sidaway, therefore, the decision of disclosure of risk was primarily left to the clinical judgment of the doctors rather than respecting the autonomy of the patient. This case accepted the primacy of the ethical principle of self-determination which forms the bedrock of individual or patient autonomy (Miola, 2007, p. 73) . Holding that surgery performed without informed consent of the patient is unlawful, their Lordships declared that in modern law 'paternalism no longer rules' (Chester v Afshar, 2004, ¶ ¶ 16 & 18) . In reaffirming that informed consent was a basic human right of a patient and that it protected the dignity and autonomy of the patient, the court held that the duty to inform the patient of risks was in itself a form of damage if it was not adhered to (Chester v Afshar, 2004, ¶ ¶ 55) .
For the same reasons, proving causation and that an injury was caused due to failure of informing the patient about risks was irrelevant. The Chester decision cured an imbalance which existed in a doctor-patient relationship by providing a patient a right to receive information (Jones, 1999, p. 103) . It is recognized that nowadays the dichotomy between the 'prudent patient' test and the 'reasonable/prudent doctor' test have vanished as professional organizations for medical practitioners themselves provide for informed consent to be taken by medical practitioners (Stauch, 2005, p. 66 ).
The Chester decision has been recently applied in a case where a doctor was held liable for failing to disclose comparative risk data for a particular procedure (Birch v University
College London Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, 2008).
In Canadian law for example, under the doctrine of informed consent, the doctor has a duty to disclose all 'material' or 'unusual or special' risks. These risks are more or less such risks that the court feels would affect the mind of a patient when deciding whether or not to accept the treatment proposed (Lewis, 2006, p. 370) . The doctrine of informed consent also includes a duty to answer questions and to inform the patient about alternative forms of treatment (Francis QC & Johnstone, 2001, pp. 10-11) .
It has also been argued that the doctor-patient relationship being a fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of disclosure on the doctors. This could be a new approach in looking at the doctrine of informed consent (Jackson, 2010, p. 210; Brazier, 1987; contrast with Kennedy, 1986, p. 138) . It is thus clear that courts have played a critical role in the UK in adopting and applying the doctrine of informed consent. However, the Indian courts have not been so eager to do so.
Development of Informed Consent in India
Judicial Approach to 'Informed Consent'
In India, the Supreme Court has given primacy to the 
. (emphasis supplied)
The first situation where written consent of a patient or his kin is required is where an After receiving the complaint, the Council can enquire into the alleged professional misconduct, in this case failure to obtain informed consent, and give a hearing to the accused practitioner. If a physician is found to be guilty, then the Council has power to take any necessary steps in punishing him/her, as well as deleting the name of the physician from the list of registered practitioners authorised to practice medicine. In the interim, before a decision of guilt is made, a physician can also be circumscribed from performing any medical procedure or practice under scrutiny.
Being the only recognition of the doctrine of informed consent, it is clear that due to its limited applicability (to IVF procedures) it is insufficient to ensure that the aims of informed consent are achieved in medical practice and care in India. Also, failure to obtain informed consent exposes a physician or other medical professional to liability in negligence. autonomy is integral to every human being irrespective of their economic or social standing, the doctor can be given some discretion to decide how much information about risks can be disclosed in different settings. Here, the communicative role of a doctor becomes important.
He must understand the perception and the context in which a patient looks at the risk and then disclose the same. However, this reinforces the 'reasonable doctor' test which has been discarded in the UK since Chester. Secondly, if the doctor is given the discretion to decide the 'best interest' of the patients in a country like India that may also lead to misuse which the principles behind informed consent militate against. 
Transplantation of Human Organs
Consumer Protection Act, 1986:
The Consumer Protection Act ('CPA') has also been invoked in many cases of medical negligence since the Supreme Court in V.P. Shantha permitted the same (Indian Medical Association v V.P. Shantha and Others, 1995) . In various cases under the CPA, the consumer forums and commissions have held doctors to be negligent for failure to obtain informed consent (Dr. AK Mittal & Anr v. Rajkumar & Another, 2009 
; H.S. Tuli v Post Graduate
Institute of Medical and others, 2008; Saroj Chandoke and others v Sri Ganga Hospital and others, 2007) .
Conclusion
It is clear that unlike many other fields of law where Indian law mirrors the changes in the UK, in the case of doctrine of informed consent, the current economic and societal problems do not permit us to apply a liberated doctrine of informed consent in India.
However, the forward-thinking ruling of the House of Lords in Chester cannot be sidelined.
The question eventually boils down to whether medical ethics should follow the law or viceversa. In Sidaway and Chester both the courts held that law should be in the driver's seat. In India, there is no reason why this should not be the case. Additionally, informed consent has already been recognized in the Code of Medical Ethics which points to the fact that there is a readiness in the people of India and more importantly the medical profession to assume a greater responsibility in disclosure of material risks before performing medical procedures.
The way forward would be to recognize this and to implement it in other areas of medical practice and only then will the principles of bodily autonomy and self-determination be of value to Indians. This role is primarily of the courts in India and by only recognizing this can
